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Abstract
We propose a new efficient online algorithm to
learn the parameters governing the purchasing be-
havior of a utility maximizing buyer, who responds
to prices, in a repeated interaction setting. The key
feature of our algorithm is that it can learn even
non-linear buyer utility while working with arbi-
trary price constraints that the seller may impose.
This overcomes a major shortcoming of previous
approaches, which use unrealistic prices to learn
these parameters making them unsuitable in prac-
tice.
1 Introduction
Modeling the arrival and response behavior of a buyer to a
collection of items sold by a seller has a rich history in op-
erations management[Cohen et al., 2016] and machine learn-
ing [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003; Amin et al., 2014], and
helps answer questions such as: what assortment of items
should a seller show a prospective buyer? How should she
price them? Much work in this area can be divided into two
categories: (1) explicitly learning the purchase model, and
(2) maximizing the revenue or some other function given a
behavior model.
In particular, online problems in the latter cate-
gory [Besbes and Zeevi, 2015; Chakraborty et al., 2009;
Alaei, 2011; Cai and Daskalakis, 2011; Blum et al., 2011],
instead of learning the buyer behavior, optimizes what is
known as regret, which is the difference between what the
seller could have done in hindsight compared to what they
did in a sequence of interactions with the buyer. Although
the regret setting is appealing, the techniques and the corre-
sponding algorithms tend to be very specialized (except for
perhaps the simplest cases) and lacks universality. In particu-
lar, many of the general purpose algorithms (such as Thomp-
son Sampling and UCB) depend linearly on the number of
actions, which is not-ideal when the action space is large or
infinite (as is the case for us). Specialized analysis or algo-
rithms address this dependence issue but depend heavily on
the structure of the objective and the decision problem. Fur-
ther, if the objective or the decision structure changes, either
because of business considerations or as new business logic
is introduced, one has to design new algorithms from scratch.
Thus, it is economical and convenient to decouple the esti-
mation problem from the decision making problem and ex-
plicitly estimate the parameters of buyer behavior first (also
called pure exploration).
There is a recent line of work on learning
the behavior of buyers online [Balcan et al., 2014;
Beigman and Vohra, 2006; Bei et al., 2016]. Compare
to these works, our algorithm does not share a key shortcom-
ing, which is the necessity of posting unrealistic prices in
the process of learning. Note that, learning buyer behavior
in the offline (batch data) setting has also been addressed
in recent works. For instance, in [Letham et al., 2016], the
authors learn the parameters of a particular buyer behavior
model that considers preference lists. We believe the online
setting is relatively more interesting because there is scope
for real-time personalization tailored to each individual buyer
compared to the offline setting.
In this paper we consider a buyer behavior where the
buyer’s objective is sensitive to prices. This type of sen-
sitivity to prices to prices has been considered in the on-
line setting [Roth et al., 2016] in the context of regret min-
imizing profit maximization, as well as in the offline set-
ting [Letham et al., 2016]. In each interaction, the seller
prices a collection of items and the buyer responds by pur-
chasing various quantities of each item that maximizes her
objective/utility. Previously proposed algorithms resort to
posting unrealistic prices to induce the buyer to buy/not-buy
certain items. Our algorithm eliminates this shortcoming by
learning the buyer behavior while being constrained to post
prices from a predefined set of realistic prices (described in
Section 2), which is provided as an input. The practical moti-
vation for such a constraint to be imposed is straightforward:
prices of items in many commercial settings are only allowed
to vary between realistic lower and upper bounds. This is
because of business constraints and prior knowledge on the
market value of goods and items. More involved constraints
include bundle prices (where prices are tied to each other) and
promotion/discount prices that are also specified by business
rules. Further, all such constraints can vary arbitrarily over
time.
The fact that our algorithm can learn despite such pricing
constraints makes it practical and applicable in real scenarios.
Internally, it exploits the concavity property of the buyer’s
objective and uses projected gradient descent to shrink an un-
certainty ellipsoid around the true buyer model parameters.
Our Technical Contribution
1. Unlike Algorithm 2 in [Balcan et al., 2014] (in a buyer
model related to the one considered here) which breaks
when prices are restricted, our online learning algorithm
is able to make progress. Specifically, it gets ǫ-optimal
estimates in roughly O(n2 log nǫ ) interactions even for
non linear buyer utility (versus O˜(n) taken by the former
to learn linear utility). Thus, we provide a bound (The-
orem 10) on the number of interactions our algorithm
needs for learning the buyer parameters. Reducing the
number of interactions is important because while learn-
ing, the algorithm is agnostic to the revenue generated.
2. The key feature of our algorithm is that it searches for
”realistic” prices (Lemma 3) that induce purchase of
specific target bundles (Theorem 5), and creates hyper-
planes corresponding to these price vectors to sequen-
tially split the uncertainty set over the buyer’s parame-
ters.
Comparison With Previous Work
From [Roth et al., 2016], we re-purpose the use of a gradi-
ent descent based technique (used in solving the convex pro-
gram in Equation (3)) for interacting with the buyer. While
they do not need any specific variant of the gradient descent
algorithm, we explicitly choose a certain step rule (constant
step length) to bound our learning errors. Our own contri-
bution here is the use of these gradient descent moderated
interactions in a ”realistic” price space (an additional caveat)
to enable the seller (1) approximately learn the ”value” of the
goods purchased by the buyer without knowing his ”inherent”
utility (Lemma 3, Theorem 5) and, (2) split the uncertainty
ellipsoids, whereas [Roth et al., 2016] use such interactions
for solving a specific structured Stackelberg game (requiring
very different tools and techniques in the process).
Similar to [Cohen et al., 2016], we use two specific eigen-
value lower bounding lemmas (see Lemma 7 and 8) to bound
the number of rounds of interaction needed by our algorithm.
Their proposed algorithm, which essentially does a multidi-
mensional binary search for the best price to post in each
round can break if there is a coupling across items. On the
other hand, the search procedure our algorithm follows can
handle such coupling as the ellipsoidal procedure searches
for parameters related to the entire universe of items. Another
key difference between our setting and [Cohen et al., 2016]
is that we work with multiple items in each round in con-
trast to their single item setting. While using an ellipsoid
to represent uncertainty in parameter estimation, the cut di-
rection and the hyperplane placement is straightforward in
[Cohen et al., 2016]. On the other hand, in our algorithm,
in the presence of realistic pricing constraints we carefully
choose the cut direction as well as position the separating
hyperplane by solving the dual of a specific optimization
problem using projected gradient descent. Finally, note that
their problem is a version of the contextual bandit problem
for which general purpose algorithms are already available,
whereas our problem is not a contextual bandit instance. Fur-
ther, we note that algorithms in both [Roth et al., 2016] and
[Cohen et al., 2016] cannot be easily extended to the realistic
prices setting (defined in Section 2), which is our key empha-
sis here.
For the buyer models that we consider, the utility U(x)
need not be linear in the bundle, so even polynomial utility
functions can be learned as long as certain conditions men-
tioned in the assumptions of Section 3 are met. This makes
our algorithm and its analysis in Section 3 more generally ap-
plicable.
2 Realistic Prices
Here we define what we mean by realistic prices which will
constraint the prices that the seller can set while learning the
buyer model (Section 3).
The price pi of an item i is realistic if it lies within the
interval [p0i − δi, p0i + δi], where p0i is the median price point
and 2δi is the length of the interval (without loss of generality,
we can assume symmetry here). This leads to an n-orthotope,
which is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A set of prices is said to be realistic if it is of
the following form:
P = {p ∈ Rn+ | ‖S−1(p− p0)‖∞ ≤ 1} , (1)
where p0 ∈ Rn+ is the median price point,∆ = [δ1 · · · δn]T ≥
0, and S = diag(δ1, · · · , δn) is its corresponding diagonal
matrix. The length of the realistic price interval for each item
i ∈ [n] is thus 2δi.
For analysis, we will assume that the set P is enclosed in a
Euclidean ball of radius R.
3 Buyer Model
We represent a bundle of goods x ∈ C ⊆ [0, 1]n (where C
is the feasible set) by a vector representing what fraction of
each of the n goods is purchased. The prices are represented
by a vector p = (p1, · · · , pn) ∈ Rn. The price of a bundle x
is simply pTx =
∑n
i=1 pi · xi. When the buyer is provided
with a price vector p, she buys the tie-breaking utility max-
imizing bundle, x∗(p), which is the optimal solution of the
following optimization program:
x∗(p) = argmaxx∈C U(x) +
4
µ
(
n∑
i=1
√
xi
)
− pTx.
(2)
Ideally, a utility maximizing buyer would maximize
U(x) − pTx, where U : [0, 1]n → R specifies their utility
for each possible bundle. Since this could potentially lead
to multiple optimal bundles (e.g., when U is not strictly con-
cave), we add a tie-breaking perturbation to the original util-
ity function to introduce consistency in the buyer’s decision
making process. That is, we model the buyer’s effective util-
ity function as U ′(x) = U(x) + 4µ
(
n∑
i=1
√
xi
)
, where µ is a
positive constant. There is nothing special about the choice of
the tie breaking function, and many other choices can also be
used to make the solution unique (for instance, we can use the
Cobb-Douglas function as well). The solution x∗(p) is called
the induced bundle at prices p. The seller’s goal is to learn
the parameters of the function U(.) by observing the bundles
bought in a sequence of interactions, where the seller chooses
realistic prices of items in each interaction. The complexity
of any learning algorithm in this setting is typically the num-
ber of interactions the seller makes with the buyer to learn the
parameters with sufficient accuracy.
Assumptions: We assume that the seller knows the set C of
feasible bundles. This is a mild condition, and can be mined
from historical purchase data. The set C ⊆ dom U ′ is as-
sumed to be non-empty, compact and convex and ∀x ∈ C,
‖x‖1 ≤ γ1 and ‖x‖2 ≤ γ2 (here ‖a‖q refer to the ℓq-norm of
vector a). We further assume that C = {xTPx+2qTx+r ≤
0} , where P ∈ Sn, q ∈ Rn, r ∈ R for computational
tractability of a program. This does not affect the learning
complexity as even without this assumption the program can
be solved by performing an exhaustive grid search.
We also assume that the seller does not know the exact tie
breaking parameter µ that the buyer uses, but knows an upper
and lower bound on it i.e., µ ∈ [µ1, µ2]. We assume tie-
breaking to be the only effect of such a function and that its
functional form is known beforehand.
To ensure computational tractability of the buyer’s problem
in Equation (2), we make some generic assumptions about the
buyer’s utility function. Namely, we assume U(.) is concave
on the feasible set C. Also, let U(x) for each x ∈ C be non-
negative and non-decreasing. Since the tie breaking perturba-
tion 4µ
(
n∑
i=1
√
xi
)
is also non-negative and non-decreasing,
so U ′(x) non-negative and non-decreasing.
Further, since U(x) is concave on C, U ′(x) = U(x) +
4
µ
(
n∑
i=1
√
xi
)
, is 1µ -strongly concave on the set C with re-
spect to ‖·‖2 norm. In other words, the buyer’s problem de-
fined in Equation (2) is a maximization of a strongly concave
function over a convex set C. Hence x∗(p) exists for every
p ∈ Rn and is unique (follows from strong concavity). We
also assume that the utility function of the buyer, U(x), is
(λval, β)-Ho¨lder continuous with respect to the ‖·‖2 norm −
for all x, x′ ∈ C. Thus we have, |U(x) − U(x′)| ≤ λval ·
‖x−x′‖β2 . Note that this assumption of Ho¨lder-continuity on
the utilities is a mild one and is satisfied by a wide range of
economically meaningful utilities like Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) and Cobb-Douglas utilities.
We restrict the scope of our model to utility functions with
linear coefficients and known nonlinearities (these are with
respect to x). This includes many concave utility functions
(concave in the bundle) including the CES utility function
(this is a function of the form U(x) = (
∑n
i=1 αix
ρ
i )
β that
has linear coefficients when parameter β = 1 and ρ < 1),
the logarithm of the Cobb-Douglas function (logU(x) =∑n
i=1 αi log xi), and any other function that is approximable
by a positive polynomial of bundle x. Thus, utilities such
as Separable Piecewise-Linear Concave (SPLC), CES, Cobb-
Douglas or Leontief functions can also be learned in our
setting (although their representation has to be transformed
so that the function is linear in the parameters). Later on,
without loss of generality, we will assume U(x) = aTx =∑n
i=1 ai · xi, with a ∈ Rn+.
3.1 The Learning Algorithm
Overview: Without an interesting feasible set C of bun-
dles, the learning problem in our setting can decompose into
n scalar learning problems that can be solved using binary
search. On the other hand, when we have a non-trivial C or
a coupling across items through the function U , then binary
search is no longer applicable. The algorithm that we pro-
pose for learning the unknown parameter vector a∗ is based
on maintaining uncertainty ellipsoids around a∗ and succes-
sively shrinking their volume by constructing specific sepa-
rating hyperplanes (based on observed purchases). At each
round t, we start with an uncertainty ellipsoid Et and shrink
it to get Et+1. In particular, based on the interaction between
the buyer and the seller in the current round, we cut Et with
a hyperplane into two regions. And then we update Et+1 as
the Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid of one of these regions.
The main technical part of our algorithm is that it works
by seeking a desired purchase vector in each round. The pur-
chase vector is then used to deduce a hyperplane that cuts the
uncertainty set. Now, this purchase vector cannot be directly
accessed as we can only control prices to induce purchase.
Below, we show how to use gradient descent and duality to
find prices that induce desired bundles.
Along with the price that induces desired bundles, we are
able to get the value of these bundles. We compare these
values with the minimum and maximum values that are
possible given our current uncertainty set over parameter
vector a∗ and define appropriate hyperplanes to split the
uncertainty sets, thus shrinking them.
Finding a price that induces a specific bundle: Consider
the following convex program:
maxx∈C U
′(x)
s.t xj ≤ x̂j for every item j ∈ [n], (3)
where xˆ ∈ C is a specific bundle. Since the utility function
U ′(x) is non-decreasing and 1/µ-strongly concave, we can
see that x̂ is the unique optimal solution of the problem in
Equation (3). The partial Lagrangian of this formulation (3)
is defined as: L(x, p) = U ′(x)− pTx+ pT x̂, where p ∈ Rn+
is the dual variable. We define the Lagrange dual function
g : Rn → R to be g(p) = max
x∈C
L(x, p) = max
x∈C
U ′(x) −
pTx+pT x̂. Now the dual of the convex program in Equation
(3) can be defined as:
min g(p)
s.t p ∈ Rn+. (4)
Our algorithm needs to choose a specific bundle x̂ and
learn its value U ′(x̂). Since we can only control prices, we
show how to learn the value U ′(x̂) by working with the dual
problem. In other words, to compute U ′(x̂), which we oth-
erwise could not have since U ′(.) is unknown, we define
the problem in (3) such that its optimal solution is x̂ itself.
We can compute the minimizer p̂ of its dual in (4) because
we can control prices. And, by strong duality, we will get
g(p̂) = U ′(x̂) = OPT.
Now we focus on the problem of minimizing the function
g, which is also unknown (since U ′(.) is unknown). How-
ever, due to the structure of the dual problem, the function
g(p) can be approximately optimized using a first order op-
timization technique such as projected gradient descent. In
particular, this is the structure we exploit: we have access to
the gradients of g and these turn out to be functions of x̂ and
the actual bundles purchased by the buyer. Thus, we can set
a price p, interact with the buyer to observe the bundle pur-
chased x∗(p) and get access to the gradient. Formally, the
following Lemma 2 shows that the bundle x∗(p) purchased
by the buyer gives a gradient of the Lagrange dual function
g(·) at p.
Lemma 2. Since the convex program in Equation (3) has a
unique optimal solution, therefore g(p) is differentiable at
each p ∈ P . Moreover, if a price vector p induces bundle
x∗(p), then the gradient of g(p) at p is given by ∇g(p) =
x̂− x∗(p).
Next, we focus on the restriction to realistic prices. We are
constrained to set prices only from the realistic price space P ,
so we can only solve a restricted version of the dual program
in Equation (4), which we denote asmin
p∈P
g(p). The following
Lemma shows that instead of minimizing g(p) in Equation (4)
over p ∈ Rn+, if it is minimized over the realistic price space
P as defined in Definition 1, then the optimal value remains
close to OPT.
Lemma 3. There exists a value R-OPT such thatmin
p∈P
g(p) =
R-OPT. Moreover, U ′(x̂) ≤ R-OPT ≤ U ′(x̂) + τ , where
τ = max
{
λval
(
2Lγ1
L
)β
, λ
1
1−β
val
(
2
L
) β
1−β
}
+ Lγ1, (5)
L = ‖p0 + ∆‖−∞ and L = ‖p0 −∆‖∞ (p0 and ∆ defined
in Definition 1).
Proof. The sets C and P are convex. And P , the realistic
price space defined in Definition 1, is also closed, compact
and bounded since it is an n-orthotope as shown in Equation
(1). Therefore, by the minimax theorem [Sion, 1958], there
exists a value R-OPT such that
max
x∈C
min
p∈P
L(x, p) = min
p∈P
max
x∈C
L(x, p) = min
p∈P
g(p) = R-OPT
(6)
Moreover, R-OPT = min
p∈P
g(p) is the optimum solution of a
restriction of the dual formulated in Equation (4), as P ⊆
R
n
+, hence R-OPT ≥ U(x̂). So what remains to be shown is
R-OPT ≤ U(x̂)+τ . Let (x˜, p˜) be a pair of minimax strategies
for Equation (6). That is,
x˜ ∈ argmax
x∈C
min
p∈P
L(x, p) and p˜ ∈ argmin
p∈P
max
x∈C
L(x, p).
Now, by strong duality we have,
R-OPT = U(x˜)− p˜T (x˜− x̂).
Choosing a price vector p′ ∈ P such that
p′j =
{
p0j + δj , if x˜j > x̂j , and
p0j − δj , if x˜j ≤ x̂j ,
gives
R-OPT ≤ U(x˜)− p′T (x˜ − x̂) ≤ U(x˜)−
∑
j:x˜j>x̂j
L(x˜j − x̂j)
+
∑
j:x˜j<x̂j
L(x̂j − x˜j),
(7)
where L and L are as defined in Lemma 3. Now con-
sider the bundles y and z such that yj = max{x˜j , x̂j} and
zj = min{x˜j , x̂j} for all j ∈ [n]. Since U(.) is an increasing
function so U(y) ≥ U(x˜), and U(.) is also assumed to be
(λval, β)-Ho¨lder continuous with respect to ℓ2-norm, so we
have
U(x˜) − U(x̂) ≤ U(y)− U(x̂) ≤ λval‖y − x̂‖β2 .
Therefore,
R-OPT ≤ U(y)−
∑
j:x˜j>x̂j
L(yj − x̂j) +
∑
j:x˜j<x̂j
L(x̂j − zj)
= U(y)− L‖y − x̂‖1 + L‖x̂− z‖1
≤ U(y)− L‖y − x̂‖2 + L‖x̂− z‖1
≤ U(x̂) + λval‖y − x̂‖β2 − L‖y − x̂‖2 + L‖x̂− z‖1
= U(x̂)+
λval‖y − x̂‖β2
{
1− L
λval
‖y − x̂‖1−β2 +
L
λval
‖x̂− z‖1
‖y − x̂‖β2
}
.
(8)
Now
{
1− Lλval ‖y − x̂‖
1−β
2 +
L
λval
‖x̂−z‖1
‖y−x̂‖β
2
}
≥ 0, as oth-
erwise R-OPT < U(x̂). By substituting, t = ‖y − x̂‖2,
c1 =
L
λval
, c2 =
L
λval
γ1 and using ‖x̂ − z‖1 ≤ γ1, we
have a polynomial p(t) = tβ − c1t + c2, such that p(t) ≥ 0.
Our immediate goal is to get an upper bound on the range
in which the positive real roots of p(t) lie. Let us make a
mild assumption that β = pq with p, q ∈ Z+, and q > p
(since β ∈ (0, 1]), i.e., it is rational. With the transformation
t1/q = s, we have p(s) = c1s
q − sp − c2, and p(s) ≤ 0.
Since q > p, so the degree of the polynomial p(s) is q. Also
c1 is positive as λval ≥ 0 and L > 0 as P 6= {0}. There-
fore, p(s) is an increasing polynomial, hence we can claim
max
s
{s ∈ R+ | p(s) ≤ 0} ≤ max
s
{s ∈ R+ | p(s) = 0}.
To get an upper bound on ‖y − x̂‖2, i.e., an upper bound
on max
t
{t ∈ R+ | p(t) ≥ 0}, it suffices to upper bound
the positive real roots of the polynomial equation p(s) = 0.
Note that, using the Descartes’ rules of sign, the polynomial
p(s) has exactly one positive real root, which can be upper
bounded using Cauchy’s theorem [Obreshkov, 1963] as fol-
lows:
max
s
{s ∈ R+ | p(s) = 0} ≤ max
{(
2c2
c1
)1/q
,
(
2
c1
)1/q−p}
.
Hence,
‖y − x̂‖2 ≤ max
{(
2Lγ1
L
)
,
(
2λval
L
) 1
1−β
}
.
Now, the inequality in Equation (8) becomes
R-OPT ≤ U(x̂) + λval‖y − x̂‖β2 + L ‖x̂− z‖1
≤ U(x̂) + max
{
λval
(
2Lγ1
L
)β
, λ
1
1−β
val
(
2
L
) β
1−β
}
+ Lγ1.
The dual function g(p) is convex, and the following
Lemma 4 further shows that g(p) is also strongly smooth.
Lemma 4. The function g(p) is µ-strongly smooth with re-
spect to the ‖·‖2 norm.
Convexity and smoothness of g(p) are useful below,
where we give a projected gradient descent procedure
LEARNVALUE(x̂, τ) (Algorithm 1). Given a target bundle
x̂ ∈ C and an error budget τ (this is the same value appear-
ing in Lemma 3), LEARNVALUE(x̂, τ) minimizes g(p) over
the realistic price space P defined in Definition 1, with an
additive error of at most τ .
Algorithm 1 Solving the Lagrangian Dual
1: procedure LEARNVALUE(x̂,τ )
2: Initialize: p1 and T =
50γ2µ2
τ−R2γ2
.
3: for t = 1, · · · , T do
4: Observe the purchased bundle, x∗(pt),by the
buyer.
5: Update the price vector with projected gradient
descent:
pt+1 =
∏
P
[
pt − ηt(x̂− x∗(pt))
]
,
6: where ηt = γ/‖∇g(pt)‖, and γ = 1/T
7: end for
8: return g˜(pT ) = g(p1) +
T−1∑
t=1
∇g(pt)(pt+1 − pt) +
µ2
2
T−1∑
t=1
‖pt+1 − pt‖22.
9: end procedure
Theorem 5. (Main Supporting Result) Assuming g(p1) is
known and that τ ≥ R2γ2, LEARNVALUE(x̂, τ) (Algorithm
1) can estimate R-OPT to accuracy τ . That is after T =
50γ2µ2
τ−R2γ2
interactions with the buyer,
g˜(p
T
)− R-OPT ≤ τ,
where g˜(p
T
) is the estimate of R-OPT returned by
LEARNVALUE(x̂, τ).
Proof Sketch. The value of g at each each of the subsequent
iterates of the projected gradient procedure can be approxi-
mated using Lagrange first order approximation. Thus,
g(pt+1) = g(pt) +∇g(pt)(pt+1 − pt) + Et+1, t ∈ [T − 1],
where E is the Lagrangian error. Therefore, adding the values
of g at each iteration, the sum telescopes and we get
g(p
T
) = g(p
T
)
′
+
T−1∑
t=1
Et+1,
where g(p
T
)
′
= g(p1) +
T−1∑
i=1
∇g(pt)(pt+1 − pt). Thus,
|g(p
T
)− g(p
T
)
′ | = |
T−1∑
t=1
Et+1| ≤
T−1∑
t=1
|Et+1|. (9)
Now using Taylor’s remainder theorem and the fact that g is
µ2-strongly smooth, ‖∇2g(p)‖max ≤ ‖∇2g(p)‖2 ≤ µ2 for
all p ∈ P , we have
|Et+1| ≤ µ2
2
‖pt+1 − pt‖22, ∀i = 1, ..., T − 1. (10)
Moreover, using Equation (10) in Equation (9), and the fact
that since g(.) is convex therefore the first order lagrange ap-
proximation is a global under estimator, we get
g(p
T
)− g(p
T
)
′ ≤ µ2
2
T−1∑
t=1
‖pt+1 − pt‖22. (11)
Plugging Equation (11) in the guarantee for projected gradi-
ent descent we get:
g(p
T
)
′
+
µ2
2
T−1∑
t=1
‖pt+1 − pt‖22 ≤ R-OPT +
‖p∗ − p1‖22 + Tγ2
2γ
∑T
t=1
1
‖∇g(pt)‖2
+
µ2
2
T−1∑
t=1
‖pt+1 − pt‖22.
(12)
Therefore, in the Algorithm 1, by choosing constant step
lengths in the projected gradient descent procedure i.e., ηt =
γ/‖∇g(pt)‖, where γ = 1/T we get ‖pt+1 − pt‖ = γ
for each t = [T − 1]. Now, by assuming ‖∇g(pt)‖2 =
‖x̂ − x∗(p)‖2 ≤ γ2 and ‖p∗ − p1‖ ≤ R, Equation (12) be-
comes:
g(p
T
)
′
+
µ2
2
T−1∑
t=1
‖pt+1−pt‖22 ≤ R-OPT+
R2γ2
2
+
γ2
2T
+
µ2
2T
.
Note that τ as defined in Equation (5) is greater than R2γ2
by assumption. Thus, after at least T ≥ γ2+µ22(τ−R2γ2) iterations
the Algorithm 1 produces a τ -optimal solution, g˜(p
T
).
Therefore, combining Lemma 3 and Theorem 5, we have:
U ′(x̂) ≤ g˜(p
T
) ≤ U ′(x̂) + 2τ. (13)
Hereafter in this section, for the sake of simplicity of il-
lustration, we focus on learning the buyer’s utility function
U(x) = a∗Tx =
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i · xi assuming it is linear in both
the coefficients and the bundle (this is without loss of gener-
ality). Hence Equation (13) becomes:
a∗T x̂ ≤ g˜(p
T
) ≤ a∗T x̂+ 4
µ1
( n∑
i=1
√
x̂i
)
+ 2τ (14)
Interval containing the value U(x̂): It turns out that for a
target bundle x̂, that the seller has in mind, she can compute
an interval [ bt, bt ] using the uncertainty ellipsoidEt such that
it contains the scalar value x̂T a∗. Lemma 6 gives the opti-
mum values of the following convex programs:
bt = min
a˜∈E(A,c)
x̂T a˜, and bt = max
a˜∈E(A,c)
x̂T a˜.
Lemma 6. [Gro¨tschel et al., 2012] For any x̂ ∈ Rn \ {0},
arg max
a˜∈E(A,c)
x̂T a˜ = c+ b, arg min
a˜∈E(A,c)
x̂T a˜ = c− b,
where b = Ax̂/
√
x̂TAx̂.
So, if g(pT )
′ ≤ (b + b)/2 = x̂T c, then the unknown pa-
rameter a∗ lies in the halfspace
H = {a˜ ∈ Rn : x̂T a˜ ≤ x̂T c}. (15)
On the other hand if g(pT )
′ ≥ (b + b)/2 = x̂T c, then by
Equation (14), the unknown parameter a∗ lies in the halfspace
H =
{
a˜ ∈ Rn : x̂T a˜ ≥ x̂T c−
(
4
µ1
( n∑
i=1
√
x̂i
)
+ 2τ
)}
.
(16)
Algorithm 2 Learning Utility Maximizing Buyer’s Model
1: procedure LEARN-UTILITY (ǫ)
2: E0 = E(A0, c0) ⊆ Rn is the initial uncertainty ellip-
soid with A0 = Ra · I for Ra > 0 as defined in Theo-
rem 9.
3: Pick bundle xt = argmax
x∈C
√
xTA0x
4: do
5: g˜(p
T
)← LEARNVALUE(xt, τ)
6: if g˜(p
T
) ≤ (bt + bt)/2 = xTt c then Ht is (15),
7: else Ht is (16).
8: Et+1 = LJohn(Et ∩Ht) (here LJohn() finds the
Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid of its argument).
9: Pick bundle xt = argmax
x∈C
√
xTAt+1x
10: while (2
√
xTt At+1xt > ǫ)
11: end procedure
3.2 Analysis
Note that in LEARN-UTILITY (Algorithm 2), the uncer-
tainty ellipsoid Et+1 for the next iteration is updated using
the computation Et+1 = LJohn(Et ∩ Ht), where Ht is de-
fined by either Equation (15) or (16). The former induces a
central cut in the ellipsoid Et(A, c), i.e. the hyperplane Ht
passes through the center c and eliminates half of the volume
of the ellipsoid. On the other hand, the later hyperplane in-
duces a shallow cut and removes less than half of the volume.
Without loss of generality (as we only need an upper bound
on the number of iterations needed by LEARN-UTILITY to
learn a∗), we assume that at each iteration the relevant hyper-
plane induces a shallow cut. That is, Ht is:
Ht = {a˜ ∈ Rn : xTt a˜ ≶ xTt c± δ} (17)
where δ =
(
4
µ1
(
n∑
i=1
√
xti
)
+ 2τ
)
is the depth of the cut
induced. For LEARN-UTILITY to work we need the depth δ
to be at most
√
xTt Atxt
n , i.e. δ ≤
√
xTt Atxt
n . As the portion
4
µ1
(
n∑
i=1
√
xti
)
takes effect only in tie-breaking, i.e., we can
assume µ1 to be a large constant. Hence, the constraint on the
depth of the shallow cut becomes
√
xTt Atxt ≥ 2nτ . Also,
note that the Algorithm LEARN-UTILITY continues as long
as 2
√
xTt Atxt > ǫ. So the shallow cut condition is met (in
other words the algorithm is able to find an xt in each itera-
tion) as long as τ < ǫ/4n.
Next, the computation of the Lo¨wner-John ellipsoids
of the sets that remain after shallow cuts follows
from [Gro¨tschel et al., 2012]. The Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid of
the set Et(At, ct) ∩ {a˜ ∈ Rn : xTt a˜ ≤ xTt c + δ} is
E(At+1, ct − 1+nαtn+1 bt), and of the set Et(At, ct) ∩ {a˜ ∈
R
n : xTt a˜ ≤ xTt c − δ} is E(At+1, ct + 1+nαtn+1 bt), where
αt = − δ√
xTt Atxt
, bt = Atxt/
√
xTt Atxt and At+1 =
n2
n2−1 (1 − α2)(At − 2(1+nα)(n+1)(1+α)btbTt ).
In what follows we present the performance guarantee of
the Algorithm 2. Firstly, to bound the minimum eigenvalue
λn at successive iterations of our algorithm, we give the fol-
lowing two lemmas from [Cohen et al., 2016] also applicable
in our setting. In [Cohen et al., 2016], they are used in the
analysis of a different algorithm in a different setting (regret
minimization).
Lemma 7. For any iteration step t, we have λn(At+1) ≥
n2
(n+1)2λn(At).
Lemma 8. There exists a sufficiently small k = k(n) such
that if λn(At) ≤ kǫ2 and xTt Atxt > 14ǫ2, then λn(At+1) ≥
λn(At), i.e., the smallest eigenvalue doesn’t decrease after
the update. One can assume k = 1400n2 .
Using the above two lemmas, we can show that the number
of rounds needed by LEARN-UTILITY is upper bounded.
Theorem 9. The algorithm LEARN-UTILITY terminates af-
ter at most 20n2 ln
(
20Ra(n+1)
ǫ
)
iterations, where Ra is the
radius of the initial uncertainty set E0.
Combining Theorem 5 and 9, we get the following bound
on the interactions needed to get a tight uncertainty set around
the unknown parameter a∗ of the buyer’s utility function.
Moreover, since the volume of the uncertainty sets decrease in
successive iterations so having a bound on howmuch themin-
imum eigenvalue can decrease in one iteration can guarantee
the tightness of the uncertainty set at termination, or alterna-
tively, its maximum eigenvalue (for a special case: Corollary
11).
Theorem 10. (Main Result) Assume that the feasible set C,
the realistic price set P and the algorithm parameter ǫ obey
the condition: R2γ2 ≤ τ ≤ ǫ4n . Then, after at most t · T
interactions with the buyer, where t = 20n2 ln
(
20Ra(n+1)
ǫ
)
and T = 50γ2µ2τ−R2γ2 , algorithm LEARN-UTILITY outputs un-
certainty set E(At, ct) such that the buyer utility parameter
a∗ ∈ E(At, ct) and max
x∈C
2
√
xTAtx ≤ ǫ.
Solving the program in line 9 of LEARN-UTILITY : Even
though the program is not convex, but strong duality holds
and it can be solved by solving the following dual which is a
semidefinite program with variables λ, γ ∈ R,
max γ
s.t
[−A+ λP λq
λqT λr − γ
]
< 0
, λ ≥ 0 (18)
Specifically, if P = I and q, r = 0, then it becomes an eigen-
value problem. This leads us to the following corollary of
Theorem 10.
Corollary 11. When the feasible set C = {x ∈ Rn : xTx ≤
1} ⊆ [0, 1]n, the realistic price set P and the algorithm pa-
rameter ǫ obey the condition: R2γ2 ≤ τ ≤ ǫ4n . Then, after at
most t·T interactions with the buyer, where t amd T are as de-
fined in Theorem 10, the algorithm LEARN-UTILITY outputs
uncertainty set E(A, c) such that the buyer utility parameter
a∗ ∈ E(A, c). Moreover, ‖a∗ − c‖∞ ≤ ǫ2 , i.e, a∗ is learned
with an accuracy of ǫ2 .
4 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed an efficient online algorithm
which can be used by a seller to learn the behavior model of a
buyer that maximizes utility, by controlling prices subject to
exogenous pricing restrictions.
One of the key advantages of our algorithm is that it
is amenable to exogenous pricing restrictions imposed by
business and managerial constraints, making it relatively
more practical and user-friendly than previously proposed
approaches. Using our algorithm, practitioners can build a
model of buyer behavior from purchase and pricing data,
which can be subsequently used for inventory, pricing and
other business decisions.
Future Work: We completely side-step the issue of identifi-
ability of the model in our treatment, by reporting uncertainty
sets instead of point estimates of the true parameters. When
allowable prices are exogenous, it may happen that the best
uncertainty set is still very loose due to stringent pricing re-
strictions. Another important issue that we did not address
here is that of modeling stochasticity in the buyer models. As
our algorithm uses an ellipsoidal search template for which
noisy generalizations exist, it can be extended to the the noisy
case (appropriate noise models have to be specified here).
Our algorithm also uses projected gradient descent while in-
teracting with the buyer. Thus, noisy gradient information
obtained from the buyer can potentially be dealt with as well.
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